Friedrich Merz returned from Seoul with a warning that goes beyond a routine trade complaint. After meetings in Singapore, Japan and South Korea, the German chancellor said partners had voiced unusually forceful concern that the EU’s proposed “Made in Europe” approach could amount to a new wave of protectionism. He promised to take that message not only to Berlin but to the next European Council. [1]
The intervention matters because the governments raising the concern are precisely those Berlin and Brussels increasingly describe as indispensable partners in diversification: advanced manufacturing economies, technology powers and supporters of an open, rules-based trading system. Merz’s visit itself was organised to deepen economic and security cooperation with Singapore, Japan and South Korea. [2] The political problem is therefore not simply whether Europe should shield itself from Chinese overcapacity. It is whether the instruments used to do so can be reconciled with an external coalition strategy.
What changed in Seoul
Merz said the intensity of the objections had surprised him. His remarks focused on the proposed Industrial Accelerator Act, which he described as initially directing public automotive procurement towards Europe. He argued that the European market must remain open to foreign competitors because German and European firms can succeed in Asian markets only if reciprocity and competition are preserved. [1]
South Korea made the issue more concrete. President Lee Jae Myung asked for EU attention to ensuring treatment equivalent to that of member states under the proposed Act, presenting Korea as a key EU free-trade partner. The two governments simultaneously announced an enhanced strategic partnership spanning advanced technologies, critical minerals, energy, industrial cooperation and security. [3] That juxtaposition is revealing: the same partner Europe wants in resilient supply chains may face exclusion from demand-side industrial policy.
The Commission’s proposal is not yet EU law. Presented on 4 March, the Industrial Accelerator Act would deploy targeted “Made in EU” and low-carbon criteria in public procurement and public-support schemes, while attaching conditions to some large foreign investments in strategic sectors. It is intended to support European manufacturing and decarbonisation, not to impose a blanket closure of EU markets. [4] But partner governments will judge its practical operation—eligibility rules, origin thresholds and exceptions—rather than its stated rationale.
Why the diplomatic constraint is real
European preference has a defensible policy logic. Public spending can create demand for low-carbon steel, clean technologies and automotive supply chains where European producers face high energy costs, climate obligations and intense subsidised competition. A narrowly tailored instrument can also reduce exposure to concentrated suppliers and encourage production that is more resilient to geopolitical disruption.
Yet de-risking is not synonymous with autarky. Europe’s capacity in batteries, semiconductors, critical minerals, clean-tech equipment and advanced components will depend for years on commercial links with non-EU partners. Japan and South Korea are not interchangeable suppliers; they are potential co-investors, technology collaborators and rule-setting partners. Singapore, meanwhile, is a major regional trade and logistics hub. If European preference treats such economies principally as third-country competitors, it may discourage the very supply-chain diversification Europe seeks.
Merz has thus identified a credibility gap in the EU’s external economic message. Brussels asks partners to reduce dependence on China, defend multilateral rules and cooperate against coercion. But a preference regime that offers them no predictable route to participation could make that appeal look asymmetrical: Europe wants allied diversification abroad while reserving strategic demand at home. This would not automatically make the Act protectionist in a legal sense. It would, however, make it harder to assemble durable political consent around Europe’s economic-security agenda.
Policy implications for Berlin and Brussels
The immediate task is not to abandon local-content policy, but to distinguish trusted-partner integration from indiscriminate openness. The EU could establish transparent, conditional pathways for countries with robust trade agreements and comparable commitments on market access, supply-chain security, labour and environmental standards. Such access should be enforceable and reciprocal, rather than based on ad hoc political assurances. The aim would be to avoid creating loopholes for diversion while recognising that trusted industrial partners can reinforce European resilience.
Germany has particular reason to press this case. Its export model makes it vulnerable to retaliatory market closure, while its manufacturing base needs reliable Asian inputs and demand. Merz’s position is also a challenge to Berlin: it cannot call for a coalition of like-minded economies in Asia and support EU rules that leave coalition members unsure whether they count as partners when public money is allocated.
For the Commission, the wider lesson is institutional. Industrial policy, trade policy and foreign policy are now operating on the same terrain. A measure negotiated chiefly among member states and domestic industries can have consequences for security partnerships, free-trade agreements and critical-mineral diplomacy. Consultation with affected partners before rules harden is therefore a strategic requirement, not a courtesy.
What to watch
The first test will be whether Merz converts his Seoul commitment into a specific German position in Council negotiations: notably on the definition of eligible origin and on conditions for partner-country equivalence. A second will be whether Seoul, Tokyo and Singapore seek a collective rather than bilateral response. Their leverage is greatest if they frame the issue as one of reciprocal coalition-building rather than a demand for exemptions.
The central uncertainty is whether European leaders can preserve room to defend industrial capacity while treating trusted external partners as contributors to resilience. If they cannot, “Made in Europe” may produce a narrower industrial perimeter at the cost of a weaker geopolitical coalition—the opposite of the strategic autonomy Europe says it wants.
