Friedrich Merz has moved Europe’s critical-minerals debate from the language of resilience to the harder politics of ownership. Speaking in Berlin on 5 November, the German chancellor called for strategic stocks of critical raw materials to be built “in Brussels, at the European level”, alongside diversification, recycling and a stronger circular economy. He tied the proposal to the material base of batteries, high-performance motors, semiconductors and other strategic technologies. [1]
The intervention matters because it is not simply another appeal to reduce dependence on China. An EU reserve would require decisions on which materials to buy, who pays, where they are held and which firms can draw on them. Those are distributive questions between member states, sectors and taxpayers. Merz has turned de-risking into a test of whether the Union is prepared to mutualise part of the cost of supply security.
What changed
Merz’s proposal arrives after Brussels had begun to develop the components of a stockpiling policy. The Commission’s 2025 RESourceEU action plan envisaged a European Critical Raw Materials Centre with a role in joint purchasing and stockpiling, and said that a first pilot would begin with member states in early 2026. [5] In September, the Commission sought an implementing entity for a pilot capable of designing, procuring, storing, managing, releasing and testing critical-raw-material reserves. [3]
The chancellor is therefore endorsing and seeking to elevate an emerging EU instrument rather than proposing an entirely new one. His October speech at the Berlin Global Dialogues had already argued for a European raw-materials agency to coordinate purchasing and stockpiling for all 27 member states. [2] The new element is political specificity: a German leader is publicly identifying EU-level inventories as a necessary component of economic security, not merely a technical contingency measure.
The proposal also sits within the Critical Raw Materials Act’s wider architecture. The regulation sets 2030 benchmarks for extraction, processing and recycling capacity, and seeks to limit dependence on any single third country to 65% of annual EU consumption for each strategic raw material at the relevant processing stage. [4] Stockpiles cannot meet those structural objectives. They can, however, buy time when disruption arrives before new mines, processing plants or recycling facilities can respond.
Why collective reserves matter
Critical-mineral disruptions differ from oil shocks in ways that complicate reserve design. The EU’s strategic-materials list covers inputs with different markets, forms, grades, storage requirements and downstream users—from battery-grade lithium and graphite to gallium, germanium, tungsten and rare earth elements for permanent magnets. [4] A reserve that is too broad risks dispersing public capital; one that is too narrow may leave other bottlenecks exposed.
The central question is not whether Europe should hold material, but whether it can establish a credible allocation regime before a crisis. National stockpiles can give governments with large industrial bases faster control. Yet an uncoordinated approach could encourage competitive purchasing, lift prices and concentrate protection in wealthier member states. A jointly governed reserve offers a stronger answer to internal-market fragmentation, but only if access rules are transparent and insulated from ad hoc national pressure.
Merz’s call also raises a financing issue that existing EU policy has not resolved publicly. Physical inventories impose acquisition, insurance, storage, rotation and potential write-down costs. A common budget would spread risk but invite disputes over contributions and benefits. Industry financing could preserve budget discipline, but firms may resist paying for stocks that competitors can access or governments control in an emergency. A hybrid model—EU seed funding, user fees and obligatory industry participation in designated value chains—may be more feasible, but would still require clear state-aid and competition safeguards.
From China exposure to supply-chain governance
The immediate geopolitical rationale is concentrated global production and processing, particularly China’s position in several critical-mineral value chains. But reserves should not be treated as a substitute for commercial diversification. They cushion a temporary interruption, but do not create new sources of supply or processing capacity. If policymakers use stockpiles to defer investment in mining partnerships, refining, substitution and recycling, Europe could become better prepared for a short disruption while remaining vulnerable to sustained coercion or chronic scarcity.
This is why the sequencing of the Commission’s approach matters. Its pilot is intended to test procurement, storage, management and release, not to create a fully fledged reserve overnight. [3] The EU should use it to identify materials for which a modest inventory has high economic value, assess how quickly users can substitute inputs, and map dependencies beyond raw ore into chemicals, magnets, wafers and components. The relevant unit of resilience is often a specific industrial input at a particular stage of processing.
There is also a trade-policy dimension. Collective EU purchasing could improve bargaining power with reliable supplier countries and offer greater certainty for investment in non-Chinese extraction and processing. Done poorly, however, it could be perceived as Europe attempting to lock up supply through public purchasing power. Partnerships will be more durable if they combine offtake certainty with local processing, environmental safeguards and economic value for producer countries rather than treating them simply as alternative mines.
What to watch
Three tests now follow. First, the Commission and member states must specify whether the pilot will serve civilian industry, defence needs, or both; the answer will shape priorities and release authority. Second, Berlin must clarify whether it favours EU-budget funding, national contributions, industry levies or a voluntary coalition. Third, the proposed Critical Raw Materials Centre needs a mandate that connects market intelligence and joint purchasing to a pre-agreed crisis protocol.
Merz has identified a real gap between Europe’s de-risking objectives and its capacity to absorb a sudden supply interruption. The proposal’s strategic value will depend on whether Brussels can convert that diagnosis into rules that are economically disciplined in normal times and politically credible when material is scarce.
